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CASE NOTES
the problems surrounding the showing of such purpose by either the seller
or his agent.
ANTHONY M. FREDELLA
Chattel Mortgages—Bill of Sale to Secure Debt—Effect of Granting
Borrower Permission to Sell the Secured Chattel.—Peopies Loan e-4
Finance Corporation of Rome v. McBurnette.'—An action of trover was
brought in Georgia to recover possession of an automobile. The plaintiff
granted a loan to an automobile dealer, taking a "bill of sale to secure the
debt" to the car, such bill being duly recorded as required by statute. 2 The
bill of sale stated that the dealer had the privilege of selling the car, the
proceeds to be impressed in a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, and to be
used to retire the debt.3 Subsequently, the dealer delivered the car to a third
person in settlement of a personal gambling debt. Thereafter the car was
sold to the defendant, a bona fide purchaser for value. The defendant's
demurrer was sustained in the lower court. On the plaintiff's appeal to the
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2, affirmed. HELD: the bona fide
purchaser took free of the lien of the security instrument.
Usually, one may not acquire title to a chattel from a person who him-
self has no title. However, in the present instance, the recorded bill of sale
expressly granted the dealer-borrower the power to sell the chattel consti-
tuting the security with the proceeds to be held in trust for the lender. It is
established in Georgia that one who lends money, receives and records a bill
of sale to a chattel given as security, and by express provision or clear impli-
cation of the agreement authorizes the sale of the secured chattel, causes the
borrower to become his agent for the sale and for the collection of the pro-
ceeds with the obligation to account for them. When the borrower disposes
of the chattel in the due course of business, the lender's security title is ex-
tinguished and can not be asserted as against a bona fide purchaser for
value.4 By granting such permission to sell the lender places a strong re-
liance on the borrower's honesty in dealing with the chattel and in accounting
1 100 Ga. App. 4, 110 S.E.2d (2d Div. 1959).
2 In Georgia, a bill of sale to secure a debt transfers title to the lender until the
debt is paid. The instrument must be recorded. if it is not it remains valid only
between the parties executing it, and as to others, is to be treated as an unrecorded
deed of bargain and sale. Sec Manchester Motors Inc. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
91 Ga. App. 811, 87 5.E.2d 342 (2d Div. 1955) ; Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Citizens & So. National Bank, 68 Ga. App. 393, 23 S.E.2d 198 (1st Div. 1942) ; Keel v.
Attaway, 65 Ga. App. 172, 15 S.E.2d 562 (1st Div. 1941).
3 The bill of sale recited: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it is
understood that the maker is a dealer in automobiles. He is hereby permitted to sell
the above described property. In the event of such sale, the proceeds shall immediately
become impressed in a trust for the use and benefit of the holder of this instrument.
The said funds shall immediately be used to retire this instrument and for no other
purpose."
4 Automobile Financing Inc. v. Downing Motors Inc., 95 Ga. App. 711, 98
S.E.2d 643 (1st Div. 1957); Gernazian v. Harrison, 66 Ga. App. 689, 19 S.E.2d
165 (2d Div. 1942).
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for the proceeds of the sale. 6
 A similar result occurs in other jurisdictions
which consider such financing transactions as chattel mortgages.6
 For it is
widely accepted that a lender's consent to or authorization of a sale of the
property given as security by the borrower when acted upon constitutes a
release of the lender's interest irrespective of the borrower's subsequent
failure to account for the proceeds.
In the present case, a sale by the borrower in the ordinary course of
business would act to divest the plaintiff of his security title. However, here
the borrower did not sell but instead transferred the chattel in settlement of
a personal gambling debt. Such transfer in addition to being outside the
express authorization given to the dealer, is void under the Georgia gambling
statutes:? However, the court ruled that the third party transferee's subse-
quent sale to the defendant, a bona fide purchaser for value, served to divest
the plaintiff of his security interest in the chattel. In arriving at this solution
the court makes reference to "circumstances" which gave the dealer the ap-
parent authority to transfer title to the third party. 8 In addition a Georgia
Code provision is cited which recognizes that a purchaser without notice
from a vendee with voidable title acquires a good title. Such approach, con-
sidering the transfer from the borrower to the third party as voidable and
thus giving the third party the ability to transfer title to the bona fide pur-
chaser, appears to be in direct conflict with the gambling statute' ) which
declares that gambling contracts are void. 10 Yet, in so treating the bona fide
5 National City Bank of Rome v. Adams, 30 Ga. App. 217, 117 S.E. 285 (2d
Div. 1923).
6 Quaker Oats Co. v. McKibben, 230 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1956); Schlafman v.
O'Neil, 346 Ill. App. 577, 105 N.E.2d 775 (2d Dist. 1952); Fidelity Corp. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 340 Mich. 610, 66 N.W.2d 235 (1954). See also, 10 Am. Jur.,
Chattel Mortgages, § 192.
7 Ga. Code Ann. § 20-505.
"Gambling debts are void, and all evidences of debt, except negotiable instru-
ments in the hands of holders in due course, or incumbranccs or liens on
property, executed upon a gambling consideration, are void in the hands of
any person. Money paid or property delivered up upon such consideration may
be recovered back from the winner within six months after the loss, and
after the expiration of that time within four years for the joint use of himself
and the educational fund of the country."
8
 Ga. Code Ann. § 96-207.
"Where an owner has given to another such evidence of the right of selling
his goods as, according to the custom of the trade or the common under-
standing of the world, usually accompanies the authority of disposal, or has
given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property, a sale to an
innocent purchaser divests the true owner's title."
However, such theory alone cannot satisfactorily explain how the plaintiff, who
expressly limited the dealer's authority, can be deprived of his interest in the chattel.
Since the present case is one of express authority to sell and the transfer not a purchase
from a dealer in the normal course of business, the applicability of such is to demon-
strate how the defendant in examining the title to the chattel would be reasonably
without notice of the prior unauthorized transaction.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Statutes permitting the recovery of gambling losses have been enacted in a
number of states. While they are based primarily on policy considerations of dis-
couraging gambling, their provisions and interpretations often differ. Some are strictly
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purchaser, the court reflects a desire to place the preservation of the com-
mercial transaction, on which one relies without reasonably being put on
notice of any irregularity, above the policy considerations voiding gambling
contracts. Such protection of the bona fide purchaser could also be accom-
plished if a similar situation should arise in a jurisdiction in which the Uni-
form Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial Code has become law. Both
statutes contain provisions permitting the acquisition of title by a bona fide
purchaser from one having voidable title"- or, in the proper circumstances,
where the true owner is estopped from asserting the lack of authority in the
possessor to transfer the chattel.' 2 However, before this protection can be
afforded the bona fide purchaser in this situation, the statute concerning the
recovery of gambling losses must treat such gambling contracts as voidable,
or be so construed as by the court as in the principal case.
If perhaps this result seems severe, it should be recalled that it was the
lender who, desirous of facilitating a repayment of his loan, granted per-
mission to the borrower to retain possession of the secured chattel and sell
it. In so doing, a prudent lender should be completely satisfied with both the
honesty and responsibility of his borrower. Otherwise, he runs the risk of
not only losing the chattel when sold in the regular course of business, but
also when such chattel is ultimately acquired by a bona fide purchaser, al-
though there has been an intervening transfer made in violation of such
permission and in settlement of a gambling debt.
JOHN J. DESMOND, III
Conditional Sales—Construction of Insecurity Clause.—Jacksonville
Tractor Co. v. Nativorthy. 1 —A conditional sales contract for the sale of
a farm rake contained an insecurity clause which provided that if the
"seller deems himself insecure or the property in danger of misuse or
confiscation (of which seller shall be the sole judge), . . . seller . . . may
. . . retake possession of said property, with or without process of law . . ."
After a retaking by the seller under the clause, the buyer brought this action
for conversion and obtained a favorable jury verdict in the Civil Court of
Duval County. Defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court's
refusal to grant his motion for a directed verdict was error in the light
of his uncontradicted testimony that he had deemed himself insecure. The
Court of Appeals First District affirmed, holding that the party exercising
construed and declare all such transactions utterly void in the possession of anyone;
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 329, 333; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:57-3; Va. Code Ann. 1950
§ 11-4; while others make exceptions in the case of negotiable instruments in the hands
of a holder in due course or bona fide purchasers; Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-553 (1948);
Ga. Code of 1933 § 20-505.
11 USA § 24; UCC 2-403(1).
12 USA § 23; UCC §§ 2-403(2) & (3).
1 114 So. 2d 463 (Fla. Ct. App. 1st D. 1959).
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